In this note, I am responding to Michael McMaster's post, LO10552. I have
changed the subject line because what follows has the character of a
disputation between me and Mike, and I did not want to distract list
readers who are following the thread of "Emergence". I would normally
respond directly to Mike, but I think there are some aspects of our
long-standing disagreement which are of interest to some readers.
Changing the subject line makes it easier for others to simply hit the
"Delete" button.
Michael begins:
>Jack's response to my example of my hand being mechanistic while "I"
>am not and saying this is dualistic is, I think, not accurate. Isn't
>it an act of dualism to propose that either they are all the same or
>they are separate. Quantum physics and Eastern philosophies (to name
>two areas) tells us that it's more like "and/both".
George Bernard Shaw is reputed to have said about Americans and the
English that we are "two peoples separated by a common language." (This
is not intended as a code for our contention, since I am only a
naturalized American, while Michael, although he lives in the UK now, is
Canadian.) Michael knows I dislike efforts to define meanings, because the
only tool we have to define language is language itself. I am always
fearful that discussion of definitions will lead to hair-splitting.
Nevertheless, let me say that when I used the word, "dualistic" I did not
have in mind "either/or", but rather that form of consciousness which sees
the subjective self as separate from the world. It requires great rigor
not to be duped by the reflexive conscious mind. In my experience, few
people can exercise such rigor, and many fewer still can sustain it.
Michael continues:
>But let's see if we can clarify. I think it will be important if we
>are to retain the usefulness of the material, systems thinking while
>introducing living phenomena thinking.
>
>First, I use systems in the sense the W. Gibbs defined many years
>ago. That is, a system is a mental construct which is isolated as a
>single entity of various relationships and considered as a whole FOR
>SPECIFIC PURPOSES. These "systems" are therefor totally linguistic
>and created, they may include other systems and be part of larger
>systems, and they may be part of one system in one perspective and
>another system in another perspective.
Yes. We've had an exchange on this before. I'm not sure I correctly
understand Mike's point of view here, but I have been content to interpret
it this way: The "real world" is a jumble of incoherent events and
unconnected things upon which we impose an order by describing them. When
we speak of a "system", it is not a "thing which is there" but something
we have conjured up to help us interact with it, effectively, one hopes.
>That is, I don't think a "hand as a mechanical system" is anything
>other than a construct which is useful when we want to consider the
>relationships of nerves, muscles, blood circulation, etc and their
>creation of movement.
So be it. I don't disagree. "Hand as a mechanical system" is a construct
which is useful when we want to consider "hand as a mechanical system".
>If we are interested in what makes a hand move or how a hand
>maintains itself as a living system, this mechanistic view - and what
>we include in our description - will have to change dramatically.
>
>I said,
>> >*Note: control doesn't apply to living systems AS LIVING SYSTEMS.
>
>What the above is attempting to say is that we can consider a hand as
>a mechanical (and therefor non-living) system and think about
>control. When we consider it as a living system - that is, as Jack
>says "I" and "my hand" are not different parts or separate - the idea
>of control will not be valid.
Mike and I are in complete agreement here. That's why what he said as he
continued his note in the earlier message gave me pause. He said:
>...I can move my
>>hand with more or less complete control by the mechanics of nerves,
>>muscles, etc.
That's where we part company. From my perspective the phrase "I can move
my hand..." would only have meaning if the hand were severed, as sometimes
happens in an industrial accident. Otherwise, the phrase simply
reinforces the illusory notion that "I" and "my hand" are two different
entities.
>Jack says,
>> This relies on the dualistic myth that "I" and "my hand" are two different
>> entities.
>
>No. The way I've used it implies only that we can distinguish in
>thought between "I" and "my hand" in many ways. Some will be more
>useful than others at various times.
Granted. I am only pointing out the danger of using a linguistic
construct to understand something, and then treating the linguistic
construct as though it has substance.
>Jack also says that I'm saying,
>> If one chooses to think of the hand as a physical, material system,
>> then "I" can act on it.
>
>I did not say nor imply this either. It is one way that thinking
>could occur but is not implied as valid or useful in my statements.
>What is implied in my statements is that one can consider the
>operations of a hand distinct from the "I" of which it is a part.
>Stepping into the slightly dangerous ground of example again, I think
>that if the bones of my hand are broken and it doesn't function
>anymore, I want a doctor who understands the physical mechanics of
>how hands work to operate on it.
Yes. I would never deny that hands have bones that can break and be
healed. It's even possible (although I don't really think so) that the
key knowledge needed to effect this healing is an understanding of the
hand's physical mechanics. But I must ask: If the bones need to be
manipulated, or if a surgical procedure is required, will the physician do
this, or will his hands?
>I consider Jack's example of typing a message to be an act of the
>whole is consistent with my view of being and of my view of "hand" in
>the process. That is, the mechanics of the hand are largely
>irrelevent to the process. Just as the mechanics of the typing
>machine are.
Yes, indeed. In the fundamental conception of the universe as a complex
of interactions and relationships, I believe Mike and I are completely
attuned, even if we feel the need to use different language to convey it.
One reason we use different language is that we differ about the
centrality of language as a human capability.
>However, Jack, is it logically consistent to say "it is an action
>that engages signals and feedback in continuous loops between my
>hands and my brain"? Isn't this simply a more detailed and equally
>mechanistic and subject/object approach than the original hand
>example I used? It seems so to me.
Well, Mike, logical consistency is your criterion, not necessarily mine. :-)
But in the instant case I must point out my use of the word "engages". In
everyday life I may repeatedly confuse the description (linguistic
construct) of the system (signals and feedback in continuous loops between
my hands and my brain) for the thing itself. I'm only human. But when I
think about it, or try to convey it, I will usually be careful not to make
the mistake you describe, and I will choose my words accordingly. I
realize now that I assumed you would make the same distinction I did.
I think my main point is that when you describe an action, all you have is
a description. But when you act, no description can capture it.
--Jack Hirschfeld All the lonely people, where do they come from? jack@his.com All the lonely people, where do they belong?
Learning-org -- An Internet Dialog on Learning Organizations For info: <rkarash@karash.com> -or- <http://world.std.com/~lo/>