Complexity LO7786

Dr Ilfryn Price (101701.3454@compuserve.com)
Sat, 8 Jun 1996 04:58:13 -0400

Replying to LO7770 --

Also relates to INFORMAL NETWORKS, COLLABORATION AND ORGANISATION&LO
[Rick any way of cross-referencing?]

[Host's Note: If, you've just accomplished as much cross-referencing as
possible. The LO msgs are fed into our world-wide-we archive where there
are automatically indexed by Lycos and AltaVista which will pick up the
words above. The LO archive is at http://world.std.com/~lo ...Rick]

I am glad to see John Constantine [and John Conovers and others]
introduce/ reintroduce this topic to the list.

John Conovers pointed us to game theory [Thanks for the background
references and Summary of Stephanie Forrests work]

One reference John did not offer was the -for me classic -

Evolution of co-operation [Robert Axelrod 1984 Basic Books Inc]. IMO his
conditions for encouraging the emergence of spontaneous collaboration
offer a useful guide to setting a context for networks/ collaboration to
emerge. OK there are refines situations and elaborations possible but the
basic 4 principles Axelrod reaches seem a good place to start in practice.

For those who haven't read it they are:

1. A likelihood of repeated interactions. If any player knows the game
is ending, or if it is reduced to a one-off contest the rewards for
defection are always likely to be too great.
2. A positive sum for the game as a whole. If the net reward for
collaboration is no more than the gain to one player from defection no
collaborative strategy can win.
3. A sufficient future value in collaboration. Collaborative
strategies do well because they set out to lock future rounds of the game
into a win-win rather than a win-lose or lose-lose equilibrium. If future
reward is discounted too highly, if in effect too high an interest rate is
applied to calculate the present discounted value of a future return then
sacrificing current earnings doesn't pay.
4. Swift, but not continued retaliation. TFT minimises its exposure to
defectors by retaliating immediately but does not then bear a grudge
provided the other player does not continue playing defect.

If you want a collaborative network to grow in a company set that context.

If there is a fifth condition for companies it may well the one alluded to
by John Constantine

================
I would add to the discussion
the notion that there is in a complex system the need for a "critical
mass" or adequate number of "operators" without which useful work cannot
commence and which is then merely random. The utility of this sort of
thinking is that it may apply to business and economic units which might
be considered complex systems and who can and do often operate short of
chaos.

=============

However, when translating the simulations of complex systems to real
'living systems' organic or organisational bear in mind the replicators in
the system.

Organic systems - if the evidence of the geological record is to be trusted
- spend long periods of time not evolving [or not evolving fast] because
the complex network of genes interacting in a system survive by reasching a
quasi-stability. So do organisational ones. They like to freeze up around a
certain pattern. They then stop learning. Actually even threads on this
list may display the same behaviour but I need to think about that one.

If Price
The Harrow Partnership
Pewley Fort Guildford UK
101701.3454@compuserve.com

-- 

Dr Ilfryn Price <101701.3454@compuserve.com>

Learning-org -- An Internet Dialog on Learning Organizations For info: <rkarash@karash.com> -or- <http://world.std.com/~lo/>