>For me, the notion of intersubjectivity implies that the subjectivity of
>the group is shared, at least in some manner (such as the story currently
>being constructed in an LO thread). Hence for me, multiple intersubjective
>realities only has meaning if there can validly be different groups or
>communities. You say that You have different realities with different
>people, but does this really indicate that there is not an intersubjective
>reality between All of Us?
Doug, this is an interesting point, I guess our opinions are not so
different. Of course we all do share an intersubjective reality, I mean in
a way for all of us the sky is blue. This is the smallest common
denominator. You are right the fact that I share different realities with
different persons doesn't imply that there is nothing I share with
all.(Actually I thought I didn't exclude that these realities couldn't
have common parts.) I saw your term 'single intersubjective reality'
merely as another term for objective reality. Maybe thats the reason why I
jumped on it.
My model for intersubjective reality is a kind of space with me in it's
center and thats my reality. Every other person has this kind of space too
and where these spaces are overlapping is the intersubjective reality. In
this way I see the intersubjective reality as the smallest common
denominator. I like this model because it helps me to deal with the
difficulties of the german reunification. As a former eastgerman I
definitely have a common reality with other eastgermans. It's easier for
me to communicate with them, because in a way we share the same reality.
With a former westgerman I have to create a common reality and thats not
easy. In my opinion one of the greatest problems of the german
reunification lies in the assumption that the eastgermans and the
westgermans share an intersubjective reality. IMHO thats not true. In a
certain way eastgermans and westgermans are as different as polish people
and russian people. (Maybe this is a little overblown but I guess the
picture is clear.)
>Instead of meaning an absolute reality [what I would take to be the
>co-creation of everyone], perhaps you are talking about relative
>realilties. What is shared by communities at a particular "now", could be
>the different myths or dreaming of smaller communities and at different
>times. Hence, corporate culture becomes a collection of stories or
>mythology shared by that body, perhaps one could say its dreaming.
>Perhaps We could look at the truth within the "Dreamtime" of the
>Australian aboriginal culture, and see it as the valid co-creation of a
>community of directly linked individuals, not any more or less valid than
>any other community's dreaming. Is the dreaming of corporate cultures and
>the international business culture any more valild?
I like the metaphor of dreaming. Could you tell a little more about the
'Dreamtime' of the Australian aboriginal culture.
>I was curious about your phrase, "...cognitive science teaches us that we
>cannot observe it [reality]....". Are You really suggesting that
>cognitive science has such an authority that its ideas are
>unchallengeable? Marvin Minsky has offered up beautifully insightful book
>and paradigm in "The Society of Mind", which addresses the multiple nature
>of the subjectivity of the mind. But does this really mean that when I
>"knock on the door" of your mind, that no-one is really home, just a
>networked relationship between multiple subpersonalities and functional
>identities? Or perhaps, the mind is a co-creation of fundamental
>subjective entities who really are "at home"? Where does the authority
>come from for stating that reality cannot be observed [ I am taking this
>to mean "known" or "directly experienced"]?
I never read Minsky's book but nothing has such an authority that its
ideas are unchallengeable. My formulation was maybe a bit to harsh. I
really think that the way we perceive the world should make us very very
suspicious of what we think we observed.
Maybe I was wrong with the term cognitive science, I don't had the AI part
in my mind. My opinion stems from the work of Maturana/Varela (the
translation of the geman title is 'the tree of knowledge'). They argue on
a biological basis that all the environment can do is stimulate our own
nervous system to react in it's own way. So the first selection is made by
our nervous system, the second selection is due to the fact that we only
can perceive differences. So something we perceive has to be different
from other things. But the way we make this differences is shaped by our
assumptions and our previous knowledge. The difference has to make sense
PS: As you may have noticed is english not my native language, so I
apologize for not always using the perfect matching terms and
-- Marco Frank student computer science Technical University Berlin email@example.com