Language & Learning LO970

Tim Sullivan (TJSULLIV@BCSC02.GOV.BC.CA)
Thu, 27 Apr 95 14:44:00 PDT

Replying to LO867 --

Taking off from Fred Reed's recent post on Language/ Semiotics of
Charles Peirce I venture the following comments.

I was struck by the phrases: "community of inquirers" and "...shared signs
are the means by which the individuals in the community of inquiry engage
in the process of (scientific) intelligence called for by his pragmatic
philsophy".

Ken Wilber in his recent (large) book Sex, Ecology and Spirituality
mentions the work of Saussure on this matter of language, signs and shared
meaning, or "linguistic domains". I will paraphrase as best I can.

The context of Wilber's discussion of signs is the problem of
"linguistically situated knowledge" and what it means for in relation to
contemplative or "mystical" experiences. The objection to this experience
having validity is they cannot be put into plain language, and therefore
are not epistemologically grounded, are not "real knowledge". At this
point Wilber introduces the notion of Saussure that all linguistic signs
have two components, the signifier and the signified (S/S). The signifier
is the written or spoken symbol or sound,the material component of the
sign. The signified is what comes to your mind when you see or hear the
signifier. Thus when I type DOG on the screen that is the signifier. You
read the the word, and you understand that I mean something like a furry
animal with four legs that goes wuff-wuff - that is the signified.

AND, both of these are distinguished from the actual referant, or whatever
the sign is pointing to, whether interior or exterior. (Wilber means a lot
by the interior/exterior that I can't fully go into here)Saussure's
genius, Wilber points out, was to point out that the signified is not
merely the same as referant, because "what comes to mind" depends on a
whole host of factors other than the real dog. The sign cannot be
understood as an isolated entity, rather signs must be understood as part
of a holarchy of differences intgrated into meaningful structures. Wilber
then says that both the signifiers and signifeds exist as HOLONS, or
whole/parts in a chain of whole/parts, and it is their relational standing
that confers meaning on each.

NOW, we are approaching a point here: The word dog has a shared meaningto
you and me becuase the sign exists in a shared linguistic structure and a
shared cultural background of social and interpretive PRACTICES. BUt, what
if you had never seen a real dog? The word will be meaningless unless
there are some points of shared experience that will allow you to "call
up" in your mind the same signified that I mean with the signifier "dog."

Thus, a community of learners will have shared understanding if they are
willin g to share experiences within a shared PRAXIS. And we can
formulate, a la Peirce,a way to pursue knowledge, a knowledge quest would
have three parts: Injunction: "If you want to know this do this". The
injunction leads to or opens up the possibility of an illumination, an
apprehension, an intuition, or a direct experiencing of the domain
addressed by the injunction. This is the second strand, the illumination
or apprehension. YOu see or apprehend, via adirect experience, the
disclosed data of the domain. But you could be mistaken, and thus you
check your results, your data, with others who have completed the first
two parts, with others who have performed the injunctions and obtained the
data. In this community of peers, you compare and confirm - or reject your
orginal data. This is the thrid starnd, communnal confirmation.

Peirce spoke of scientific knowlwedge but this form of Knowledge Quest as
above is equally valid in any community whether they be Tibetin monks
pursuing Knowledge of BUddha-nature, Amazon Maestras seeking understanding
of the ONE known as Auyawasca or physists seeking evidence of Quarks and
Leptons.

Enough for now.

Regards,
Tim J. Sullivan
Ministry of Health
"Tim Sullivan" <TJSULLIV@BCSC02.GOV.BC.CA>