Wow... a dense and provocative post here, Ms. Jelinek. I can only address
myself to a couple of points, in context, by interleaved glosses... .
On Fri, 21 Apr 1995, Mariann Jelinek wrote:
> Replying to LO843 --
>
> Jim's response to my stories comment, was that he came out,
> >
> >Fence-sitting, comfortably. The question I'm occupied with is
> >epistemological: how can a story contain "knowledge"? How can singular
> >occurrences (real or imaginary) instruct us? And if they can instruct us,
> >how in the world does the instruction we derive from them relate to our
> >"general knowledge" - our grand theories and systems.
> >
>
> Perhaps the underlying difficulty is the "mystery" of it all- that
> insight and understanding, "getting " a joke, koan or parable, is somehow
> grasping the ineffable (understanding beyond what is in the literal words
> because we somehow transform the analogical links into our own frame of
...yes. This, I think, is the hearer extending his theory (perspective,
view of the world, understanding) to incorporate or accommodate the
possibility represented by the story's narrative.
> meaning. Seems to me that this means a translation of sorts, from the
> singularity of a particular instance (a particular one, from Samaria, and
> what he did with another particular one, found on the road) to the general
> guideline to speak of. Just as you say,
The parable of the Samaritan - and many of the other parables as well -
are indeed perfect examples of what we're saying. Similar instances, as
you pointed out, can be found in most traditions. There are wonderful
stories in Martin Buber's collection of tales of the Hasidim.
There, in the Samaritan story, are just the elements we've identified:
the listeners whose "standard" moral universe simply did not account for
or have room for conduct such as that of the Samaritan, and would
therefore by challenged by a simple narrative saying just "this happened".
It's because of this role, I think, that these kind of stories don't have
to be "true". They only need to represent a possible path; the
listeners need only accept that it's possible, and the moral challenge
follows directly. (In fact, we can take note that some listeners, in
these situations, avoid the challenge by denying the story. "Can't happen!"
>
> >As a bare minimum, then, a story is a kind of existence theorem: "This
> >happened." And therefore "This is a possible thread through the world".
> [snip]
>
> In learning, a highly individual "aha!" that explodes in the brain
> (in VERY short periods of time) creates massive electrical discharge,
> according to some research on humor). So physiologically, we can document
> what happens when somebody "gets it" - though it's not necessarily true
> that their understanding coincides with yours or mine! When the learning
> happens interpersonally, between two or more, discussion and interchange
> can play a role (as can stories, which illustrate "how we do things around
> here," as well as what we find funny, or honorable, or desireable or holy,
> etc. ). Note the hortatory push - this is how you, too, should understand .
> Stories are, by their nature, I think, intendedly persuasive.
>
> [snip more interesting stuff here]
>
> Now, if stories are encapsuled understanding, and persuasive
> communication at that, then they contain at least an implicit "theory" of
> the world: good guys always prosper, maidens must be rescued, knights in
> shining armor are laudable (and, except for the no-goodniks, won't
> pillage, rape or burn the innocent .) or even that "the peace that passeth
> understanding" may be found in deep enough, frequent enough meditation.
> The real kicker, though, IMHO, is that the underlying theory is presented
> as an existence proof to whatever theory of the world the hearer may
Nonono. I don't believe in "underlying theory" here. And I'm
particularly concerned to persuade you to give up such a belief (if you
in fact hold it and did not just commit an accidental expression :-).
Don't the Sufi and Zen tales originate with people who have left theories
behind?
And, on a less exalted plane, the very large number of stories in Senge's
Fifth Discipline exist mostly to provide stipulative, ostensive definitions
(um, examples -- forgive my occasional lapses into polysyllabic stupor) of
important terms or concepts. And that's useful and valuable too: we need
only imagine, as a thought experiment, what the book would be without its
stories, or on the other hand without any explicit articulation of the
concepts they exemplify.
> currently embrace: "See, here's how it works!" Particularly seductive in
> this regard are "explanations that transcend the ordinary explanations,"
> like Sufi and Zen tales, where the reader/hearer must bridge the gap in
> understanding. Maybe what is "wired in" is a desire for completion, and
> the successful story induces us to fill in the blanks? To translate from
> the specific to the general to our own life, thus going "click!" when we
> achieve satori?
Yeah. One insight I come out of this with is the two roles for stories:
a) as existence theorems, to provoke rethinking and realignment of
conceptual systems; and b) as ostensive definitions of concepts
explicitly identified by the storyteller.
It occurs to me that the second kind may well be what you had in mind
when you mentioned "underlying theory". And if that's the case, I'd have
to agree that there may be one, and the storyteller may in fact be
interested in persuading his listeners of something that could be
expressed as a "theory".
Regards
Jim Michmerhuizen
jamzen@world.std.com
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